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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 03-4014
DONNA HAZEN,
Appellant
v.
MODERN FOOD SERVICES, INC., t/a Smuggler’s Cove,
RONALD SARAJIAN, Individually and as President of Modern Food Services,
Inc., t/a Smuggler’s Cove, and MISTY GERRITY, Individually and as a supervisor
of Modern Food Services, Inc., t/a Smuggler’s Cove

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-00090)
District Judge: Hon. James M. Munley
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 23, 2004
Before: McKEE, Circuit Judges,
ALDISERT and GREENBERG, Senior Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 15, 2004)
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge
Donna Hazen appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendants, denying relief on her claim of retaliation for complaints regarding sexual
discrimination. We will affirm.

I.
Inasmuch as we are writing only for the parties, we need not repeat the factual or
procedural background of this litigation except insofar as may be helpful to our brief
discussion.1
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Hazen must show: (1) protected
employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous
with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the protected
activity and her employer’s adverse action. Abramson v. William Patterson College of
New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265, 284 (3d Cir. 2001); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126
F.3d 494, 499 (3d Cir. 1997); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913 (3d Cir. 1997).
Once an employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the employer must
present a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its adverse employment action. Woodson,
109 F.3d at 920 n.2. This burden is “relatively light,” and is satisfied if the employer
articulates any legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. The employer need
not prove that the articulated reason actually motivated the adverse employment action.
Id.
If the employer tenders a legitimate reason for the employment action the
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Our review of the district court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. Watson v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we are required to
apply the same test that the district court should have utilized. Boyle v. County of
Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998).
2

employee must then convince the factfinder both that the employer’s proffered
explanation is false, and that the employer’s action was actually motivated by a retaliatory
animus. Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920 n.2.
In order to prevail on summary judgment, the employer must show that the trier of
fact could not conclude, as a matter of law, that retaliatory animus had a determinative
effect on the outcome. This may be accomplished by establishing the plaintiff’s inability
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of the plaintiff’s prima facie
case, or the credibility of any proffered explanation for the employment action. Krouse,
126 F.3d at 501.
II.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Hazen’s conversation with
Torley regarding Sarajian’s alleged statement about the circumstances of Hazen’s transfer
could be construed as a complaint under Title VII. We have previously held that informal
complaints of discrimination that were directed at co-workers rather than management
constitute protected activity for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.
Neiderlander v. American Video Glass Co, 80 Fed. Appx. 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2003). Title
VII protects employees from retaliation for the employee’s opposition to any unlawful
employment practice. Id.
Here, however, the district court concluded that Hazen failed to satisfy the second
requirement of her prima facie case because the record did not establish that her transfer
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from the bar to the dining area constituted a demotion. We agree. It is undisputed that
the rate of pay for both areas was $2.83 per hour plus tips, and the job responsibilities
were the same. Accordingly, Hazen’s claim of retaliation fails as a matter of law.
III.
Hazen’s claim that summary judgment is foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine
is frivolous. Under that doctrine, “once an issue has been decided, parties may not
relitigate that issue in the same case.” Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2003)(citing Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 616 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998). The
defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and their motion for summary
judgment obviously raised very different issues and required distinct inquiries. In
deciding the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court determines from the
pleadings “if it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any set of facts
which could be proved.” Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d
Cir. 1997). However, when deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court
reviews all discovery and determines whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Farrell, 205 F.3d at 278. The standard used to decide these two very different motions is
obviously not the same. In deciding a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the court
presumes that the plaintiff will be able to prove the allegations set forth in the pleadings,
and then determines if those allegations establish a cause of action. Summary judgment
involves no such presumption.
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Hazen failed to establish a prima facie case even though her pleading does state a
cause of action on its face. Therefore, the law of the case doctrine simply did not apply to
the district court’s summary judgment analysis.
IV.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we will affirm the decision of the district court.
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